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Unemployment and Inﬂation Regimes
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Abstract: In this paper we study 2-state Markov switching VAR models of monthly unem-
ployment and inﬂation for three countries: Sweden,United Kingdom,and the United States.
We ﬁnd that such models seem to provide a better description of the data than single regime
VARs and need fewer lags to account for serial correlation. To interpret the regimes the em-
pirical results are compared with the predictions from a version of Rogoﬀ’s (1985) model of
monetary policy. We ﬁnd that both the theoretical and the empirical results suggest that an
increase in central bank “conservativeness” can be associated with either a higher or a lower
variance in unemployment. In the U. S. case we ﬁnd that the variance of unemployment is
lower in the low inﬂation regime than in the high inﬂation regime,while the Swedish case
suggests that unemployment variability is higher in the low inﬂation regime. According to
the theoretical model this may be explained by a higher labor supply elasticity in the U. S.
than in Sweden.
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1. Introduction
Many macroeconomic models,and policy discussions,are based on the assumption that
there is no long run relation between inﬂation and unemployment. The average rate of
unemployment is assumed to beequal to somenatural or equilibrium ratethat is determined
by demand and supply conditions on the labor market,and these conditions are believed
to be at most temporarily aﬀected by factors that determine inﬂation. Average inﬂation
is assumed to be a monetary phenomenon,essentially arising from a too rapid growth of
money supply in relation to demand. Since central banks can control the money supply (at
least in the long run) they can determine the rate of inﬂation independently of labor market
conditions.
The existence of some long run relation between inﬂation and unemployment cannot be
excluded on theoretical grounds. It is possible to make quite realistic assumptions about
central banks’ (and/or labor unions’) objective functions and behavior that imply that there
is such a relation. The Barro–Gordon (1983) model implies that there could be a positive
long run relation. If the natural rate of unemployment increases,then average inﬂation
may go up if the central bank has incentives to try to lower real wages through surprise
inﬂation. Looking at U. S. data from the 1960s through the 1990s,Ireland (1998) argues
that this hypothesis cannot be rejected,i.e. the long run Phillips curve seems to have a
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tions.positive slope. Regarding the short run Phillips curve,however,the idea that there is a
negative relation between inﬂation and unemployment seems well established (see King
and Watson,1994). 1 It has also been stressed that if this is indeed the case,then one could
also expect there to be a relation between the variances of inﬂation and unemployment
(Taylor,1994). Evidence that supports this hypothesis,also based on U. S. data from the
1960s through the 1990s,has been presented by Lee (1999). 2
Furthermore,it has been argued that there may be a negative relation between the average
level of inﬂation and the variance of unemployment. The reason is that a central bank with
strong aversion against inﬂation may choose to accommodate negative supply shocks to a
smaller extent,which will result in a high variance of production and employment (Rogoﬀ,
1985). Using cross-country data,Alesina and Summers (1993) and Jonsson (1995) have
failed to ﬁnd such a relation between average inﬂation and the volatility of unemployment.
This is in itself hardly surprising,since,there are theoretical models of monetary policy
which do not have the same implication as Rogoﬀ’s (e.g. models by Walsh,1995,Persson
and Tabellini,1993,and Svensson,1997).
The use of cross–country data is based on the assumption that monetary policy regimes
are quite stable over time within individual countries,and that diﬀerences in regimes across
countries are large enough to make comparisons between countries a meaningful way to
examine the relation between unemployment volatility and inﬂation. There do indeed seem
to exist diﬀerences between countries,e.g. regarding the degree of central bank indepen-
dence,that are quite persistent (see e.g. Alesina,1988,and Cukierman,1992). But it is
also the case that there are frequent changes in monetary policy in individual countries
that,although they are not always associated with formal changes in institutions,reﬂect
changes in policy makers’ preferences,e.g. regarding the relative beneﬁts of inﬂation and
employment stabilization. The inﬂation process in a particular country thus sometimes
undergoes changes because of changes in monetary policy,and these may also alter the
relations between inﬂation and unemployment.
In this paper we look at unemployment and inﬂation data from three countries: the U. S.,
the U. K.,and Sweden. We estimate bivariate VAR models and examine if they appear to
be stable over the sample or if it is possible to detect regime changes. Two-state Markov
switching VAR models are estimated and analysed using the techniques suggested by e.g.
1 There are certain ambiguities here,since it is not obvious that the concepts “Phillips curve” and “long run”
always mean the same thing. Haldane and Quah (1998) stress the importance of distinguishing the simple
unconditional correlation between inﬂation and unemployment (what they call a Phillips curve) from a more
complex aggregate supply relation. In Ireland (1998) long run means cointegration between unemployment
and inﬂation (only),while there is negative “short run” relation conditioned on expected inﬂation and the
natural rate of unemployment. In King and Watson (1994) and Haldane and Quah (1998) short run Phillips
curves are correlations between ﬁltered unemployment and inﬂation series.
2 The hypothesis is rejected for the full sample,but not for the subsamples 1960–79 and 1980–97.
–2–Hamilton (1990,1994,1996) and Warne (1999b). 3 In order to interpret the regimes we
compare the empirical results with predictions from Rogoﬀ’s (1985) model of monetary
policy. In particular,we are interested in if the regime switches seem to be associated with
changes in monetary policy.
In Section 2 we recapitulate the relevant relations in a Rogoﬀ-type model (a detailed
derivation is presented in the Appendix) and show how this model may be compared with a
VAR model. Section 3 contains both a description of the econometric models and a rather
detailed discussion of the results for the U. S. data. Results for the other countries are more
brieﬂy presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains summary and conclusions.
2. Simple Models of Unemployment and Inﬂation
2.1. A Version of Rogoﬀ’s Model
The model by Rogoﬀ (1985) can be used to derive the following relation between unemploy-
ment and unexpected changes in the price level:










where u is the unemployment rate, p the log of the price level,and z a technology shock
with mean zero and variance σ2
z . The average rate of unemployment increases if there is an
increase in the intercept in the labor supply function, ns,but it also goes up if there is an
increase in the intercept in the labor demand function, nd. The reason is that the nominal
wage is predetermined and that wage setters (labor unions) choose a higher real wage if labor
demand goes up. This eﬀect dominates the initial demand eﬀect and hence unemployment
goes up. Wage setters want to stabilize employment around some desired level nu and an
increase in that level leads to lower wages and lower unemployment. α is capital’s share
of value added and equal to the inverse of the slope of the labor demand function; the
higher is α,the less does the real wage aﬀect labor demand and hence unemployment. For
t h es a m er e a s o n ,t h eh i g h e ri sα,the less sensitive is labor demand and unemployment to
technology shocks. ω is the slope of the labor supply function and hence the elasticity of
unemployment with respect to inﬂation surprises increases in ω.4
The central bank wants to stabilize inﬂation around the inﬂation target π∗ and employ-
ment around the target n∗,which is assumed to be higher than the equilibrium level of
3 See also Warne (1999a) and Jacobson,Lindh,and Warne (1998) for further presentation of the econometric
model and other applications.
4 The version of Rogoﬀ’s (1985) model that produces equations (1)–(3) is presented in the Appendix. In
Rogoﬀ’s original model,wages are set so as to stabilize employment around the equilibrium level that would
result if wages were perfectly ﬂexible. This implies that the average rate of unemployment is zero,which is
not desirable for our purposes.
–3–employment that would arise if wages were perfectly ﬂexible. The relative weight on in-
ﬂation in the central bank’s loss function is λ. The central bank takes the unemployment
equation (1) and wages and inﬂation expectations as given,but the private sector has ratio-
nal expectations about monetary policy. The equilibrium inﬂation rate πt = pt − pt−1 can
be characterized as follows:







There is a positive inﬂation bias if the central bank strives for a higher employment rate
than wage setters. Following Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoﬀ (1985) we assume that
n∗ >n u. The bias will however be lower,the higher is the weight on inﬂation in the central
bank’s objective function. Using (2) in (1) gives the following expression for unemployment
in equilibrium:




Table 1 summarizes how the means and variances of inﬂation and unemployment are af-
fected by changes in the parameters of the model.
It is noteworthy that this model does not predict that the variance of unemployment is
unambiguously increasing in the central bank’s inﬂation aversion parameter, λ.A l o w λ
implies that technology shocks are allowed to have a large eﬀect on the price level. This,
in turn,implies that the real wage responds strongly to such shocks,which partly oﬀsets
the direct eﬀects of such shocks on labor demand. In the extreme case of λ = 0,monetary
policy stabilizes employment at nu,but this does not stabilize unemployment,which is also
aﬀected by the eﬀects of price surprises on labor supply.5 At low values of λ(< ω/α),an
increase in the central bank’s inﬂation aversion may thus lower the variance of unemploy-
ment.6
2.2. The Empirical Model
It is possible to interpret empirical evidence on inﬂation and unemployment using the model
(2)–(3). For instance,Jonsson (1995) compares inﬂation rates in diﬀerent countries and
suggests that diﬀerences are due to “conservativeness” in Rogoﬀ’s sense,i.e. π∗ and/or λ.
Since there are no corresponding diﬀerences in terms of unemployment (mean or variance),














with the natural rate of unemployment being un
t ≡ ns−nu+ωα(nd−nu),then equations (2) and (3) imply that
φ = αλ−ω. Accordingly,if λ<ω / α ,then the slope of the short run Phillips curve is negative. Reversely,if
the short run Phillips curve is negatively sloped,then a small increase in the central bank’s inﬂation aversion
will lower the variance of unemployment.
–4–Table 1 suggests that it is more likely that the diﬀerences in average inﬂation rates are
due to π∗ than λ. Ireland (1998),in contrast,does ﬁnd a positive long run (cointegration)
relation between inﬂation and unemployment in the U. S. According to Rogoﬀ’s model,such
a relation could not be due to changes in π∗ or λ. It could be due to changes in nu,which
is consistent with Ireland’s interpretation.
However,the model of inﬂation and unemployment given by (2) and (3) has some features
which are inconsistent with other empirical facts. In the theoretical model ﬂuctuations in
inﬂation and unemployment around their means stem entirely from technology shocks,i.e.
the two variables are perfectly correlated. The model can be made more realistic by assum-
ing e.g. that there are stochastic changes in the wage setting,labor supply,or labor demand
schedules,or in monetary policy ( π∗ and λ). Moreover,one may assume that there are
control errors in monetary policy. Another problem with the model (which such assump-
tions do not automatically solve) is its counter factual prediction that the ﬂuctuations in
inﬂation and unemployment are serially uncorrelated (unless technology shocks are serially
correlated).
The observed persistence in inﬂation is sometimes attributed to price stickiness and
adaptive expectations (see e.g. Galí and Gertler,1998). An additional source of persistence
in inﬂation might be that monetary policy aﬀects aggregate demand and output with a lag.
It seems also likely that inﬂation persistence partly depends on central banks’ preferences
for employment stabilization and interest rate smoothing (see e.g. Svensson,1999).
In principle,the persistence of unemployment could also be due to nominal rigidities
and monetary policy. It seems at least equally plausible,however,that unemployment
persistence depends on properties of labor supply and wage setting functions,i.e. some
kind of real rigidities.7
In order to analyze the empirical relations between inﬂation and unemployment within a
model which is quite simple,yet able to capture important stylized facts,King and Watson
(1994) and Ireland (1998) use a bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) model:
xt = δ +
k  
j=1
Ajxt−j + εt, (4)
where xt = (πt,u t), k is the lag length,and εt is a linear combination of technology shocks
and shocks to labor demand or supply,wage setting,and/or monetary policy.
7 Theoretical and empirical models of this issue have been presented by Jacobson,Vredin,and Warne (1997),
Hansen andWarne (1997),and Ireland (1998),amongothers. Galíand Gertler(1998)suggest thatrealrigidities
may also give rise to inﬂation persistence.
–5–On the basis of Rogoﬀ’s model,we may expect the parameters of the VAR to change if
there are changes in e.g. monetary policy (π∗ or λ) or wage setting behavior (nu).8 In this
paper we therefore analyze both single regime VAR models like (4) and regime dependent
models like
xt = δst +
k  
j=1
Aj,stxt−j + εt, (5)
where st denotes an unobservable (discrete) regime variable,and εt|st ∼ N(0,Ωst).F o r
simplicity we assume that st follows an ergodic Markov process with switching probabilities
Pr[st = j|st−1 = i,xt−1,x t−2,...]= pij. The theoretical model in Section 2.1 suggests that
the regime may change due to changes in Ξ = (ns,n u,κ,α,ω,λ,π ∗,n ∗,σ2
z ),where κ is the
capital stock.
3. Unemployment and Inﬂation Regimes in the U. S.
In this section we shall discuss speciﬁcation results for U. S. monthly data on unemploy-
ment and inﬂation. In relation to the general speciﬁcation in (5) we shall focus on four
issues. First,for a VAR model with st constant,is there any evidence of cointegration be-
tween output and unemployment? If there is evidence of one unit root in xt,then the linear
combination between inﬂation and unemployment can be interpreted as a “long run Phillips
curve”,possibly consistent with the Barro–Gordon and Rogoﬀ models,as suggested by Ire-
land (1998). Second,does the constant (or single) regime model appear to be well speciﬁed?
To address this question we shall perform some common misspeciﬁcation tests. Third,we
shall consider estimation of a cointegration relation under the assumption that the VAR
model is subject to switching regimes. Finally,we will check which changes in the set Ξt
that are feasible explanations for the diﬀerences between the regimes.
3.1. Single–Regime VAR Models
The U. S. time series for the sample period 1959:1–1998:12 are portrayed in Figure 1. The
inﬂation series is computed from the CPI (base year is 1967) for all urban consumers (U. S.
city average,not seasonally adjusted) and is taken from the U. S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The series is in natural logarithms and measured as the monthly
change in annual percent. The unemployment series is also taken from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and is measured as (100 times) the natural logarithm of the civilian labor force
relative to the civilian employment (number of people). Both these labor market series are
seasonally adjusted and are based on workers that are 16 years or older.
8 Ireland (1998) does not ﬁnd any signs of parameter instability in his VAR model,although such evidence
has earlier been reported by King and Watson (1994). The results from Lee’s (1999) multivariate GARCH
model also suggest that the parameters are unstable.
–6–Figure 2 presents scatter plots of the data. The top panel contains the monthly inﬂation
ﬁgures measured as a yearly inﬂation rate (πt = 12[pt − pt−1]),while the bottom panel
depicts yearly inﬂation (π
(12)
t = pt − pt−12). As expected,the monthly variation in inﬂation
seems to be greater than the yearly. Moreover,both inﬂation measures as well as unem-
ployment seem to have positively skewed distributions,where in particular large values for
unemployment tend to coincide with small values for inﬂation. For other values,however,
it’s diﬃcult to see any relation between the variables.
The results from testing for cointegration,i.e. a long run relation between these vari-
ables,are displayed in Table 2. The statistical model is a standard,single–regime VAR( k)
with Gaussian errors,centered seasonal dummies,and the constant is restricted to the coin-
tegration space; see e.g. Johansen (1995). The restrictions on the constant ensure that if
there are unit roots in xt,then the time series will not have a linear trend. According to the
asymptotic distribution of the so called trace statistic (LRtr in Panel A),there is evidence of
one,but not two unit roots. 9
In Panel B we report tests of the hypothesis that either unemployment or inﬂation is
stationary,conditional on a single unit root. For lag orders between 6 and 12,all hypotheses
are rejected at the 5 percent level and only in the case of inﬂation at shorter lags is there
an indication that the series may be stationary at the 1 percent level. The point estimates
of the cointegration vector when we normalize the relation on inﬂation are presented in
Panel C of Table 2. For lag orders between 6 and 12 the coeﬃcient on unemployment is
negative and,in absolute terms,greater than unity. Hence,the cointegration analyses from
the linear VAR models suggest that there is a positive long run relation between inﬂation
and unemployment for the U. S. data.
This ﬁnding of a cointegration relation between (or,equivalently,a common stochastic
trend in) inﬂation and unemployment should not be surprising. Although the estimate of
the normalized cointegration relation, πt − βuut,yields a much larger slope of the “long
run Phillips curve” than reported by Ireland (1998),an estimate of βu in the interval [1,2] is
not unreasonable in view of the theoretical model in Section 2.1. According to that model,
a common stochastic trend may be due to a trend in wage setters’ employment goal nu.10
In that case, βu = 1/(αλ(1 + ωα)) and the estimates of βu are consistent with “realistic
values” of the theoretical parameters.
On the other hand,when we turn to the speciﬁcation analysis in Table 3,we ﬁnd that all
these models,to various degrees,appear to suﬀer from serial correlation and/or conditional
heteroskedasticity for the residuals. In Panel A we report two serial correlation tests,a
9 These results are not qualitatively aﬀected by the exclusion of seasonal dummies in the VAR.
10 This also seems to be consistent with Ireland’s (1998) interpretation of a stochastic trend in the natural
rate of unemployment.
–7–system based Ljung–Box test and a system based LM test,and in Panel B,equation based
ARCH tests; the column “# Unit Roots” refers to the number of unit roots that have been
imposed on the system,e.g. zero unit roots is an unconstrained VAR( k)m o d e lf o rxt.
The LM tests indicate that the VAR residuals are serially correlated for all lags orders at
the 5 percent level,while the Ljung–Box tests suggest that a lag order of 8 may be suﬃcient
to capture serial correlation in xt. Moreover,the test results are only weakly inﬂuenced by
a unit root restriction.
From Panel B we ﬁnd evidence of kth order ARCH in both equations at the shorter lags
and in the case of inﬂation also for the VAR(12) models. Hence,the standard,single–regime
VAR model does not seem to be consistent with the U. S. data.
3.2. Two–State Markov Switching VAR Models
In this section we shall examine a VAR model with 2 regimes where the regime process,for
simplicity,is assumed to follow an unobserved ergodic Markov chain. Visually inspecting
the unemployment series suggests that the “jumps” may either be due to large shocks to a
stochastic trend or to regime shifts (or both); see Figure 1:III. The ﬁnding of a unit root in
the single regime VAR models for xt may thus be spurious. On the other hand,if there are
unit roots in xt,there are several ways one can account for such a feature in an MS–VAR
model.
Karlsen (1990) presents a suﬃcient condition for stationarity for a q-state MS–VAR(k);
see also Holst,Lindgren,Holst,and Thuvesholmen (1994). Let e1 ≥ ... ≥ e8k2 ≥ 0b et h e
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where Ast is the 2p × 2p matrix obtained from a VAR(1) stacking of equation (5),and
pij = Pr[st = j|st−1 = i]. Karlsen’s condition for stationarity states that xt is second
order stationary if e1 < 1. Similarly,if e1 = 1a n de2 < 1,then xt has exactly one unit root.
A straightforward approach to imposing a unit root on the system in equation (5) is to
ﬁrst express it in an “error correction” form:
∆xt = δst +
k−1  
i=1
Γi,st∆xt−i + Πstxt−1 + εt, (7)
where Γi,st =−
 k
j=i+1 Aj,st, Πst =
 k
j=1 Aj,st − I2 = αstβ ,with β being a 2 × 1 vector with
rank 1.11 Second,this system can be stacked in VAR(1) form,with autoregressive matrix
11 A special case of the error correction model in (7) is discussed by Krolzig (1996).
–8–Γst,and a new A matrix can be deﬁned as in (6),but with Ast replaced with Γst.I fe1 < 1f o r
the new A matrix,then ∆xt and β xt are stationary processes.
Alternatively,the MS–VAR model for xt in (5) can be rewritten as an MS–VAR model for
yt = (S∆xt,β  xt),where (S,β ) has rank 2 (for instance, S = β 
⊥),i.e.
yt = ψst +
k  
j=1
Bj,styt−j + ϕt, (8)
where ψst = Bδst, ϕt = Bεt, B = (S,β ),and Bj,st is a function of (B,Γj,st,Γj−1,st) for k ≥ 2,
while B1,st depends on (B,Γ1,st,α st). Stacking this system in VAR(1) form,with autoregres-
sive matrix Bst,then yt is stationary if e1 < 1f o ra nA matrix based on Bst rather than
Ast.
For the U. S. data we ﬁnd that the largest eigenvalue for an MS–VAR(3) model for xt is
about .962 and for an MS–VAR(2) model .974,thus suggesting that xt does indeed have a
unit root.
Maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters in (7) can be achieved via the EM al-
gorithm (see e.g. Hamilton,1990,1994). One diﬃculty,relative to a model that is linear
conditional on the regime (such as (5)),is the nonlinear relation involving αst and β.I nt h i s
paper we use a grid search procedure,where the grid is determined by β. This means that
estimation of (7) and (8) involves solving the same problem since both systems are linear
conditional on β and on the regime. We shall therefore only examine the representation in
(8).
Speciﬁcally,we let the coeﬃcient on inﬂation be equal to unity and vary βu.F o re a c hv a l u e
of βu in the grid,the free parameters deﬁned by (pii,ψ i,B j,i,Σi : i = 1,2;j = 1,...,k),where
Σst = BΩstB ,are estimated via the EM algorithm and the corresponding value of the log–
likelihood function is computed. The value of βu which achieves the largest log–likelihood
value is then selected as the estimate of βu.
The grid search results from estimating a 2–state MS–VAR(2) model of yt are summarized
in Figure 3. In addition to the value of the log–likelihood function we have also plotted the
largest eigenvalue for (8); the log–likelihood values have therefore been scaled in Figure 3.12
This procedure gives us an estimate of βu equal to .039,while the value of ln L is equal to
−922.63.13




















where the grid is speciﬁed over the interval [−2,3].
13 For the MS–VAR model which does not impose the unit root,i.e. the system in (5) with k = 3a n dai2,3,st = 0
for i = 1,2,the value of ln L is −914.66. Relative to the model in (8),this MS–VAR has 3 additional free
parameters.
–9–The estimate of the cointegration relation conditional on two regimes thus produces a
much smaller slope of “the long run Phillips curve” than what comes out of the single regime
models. The estimate of βu is also much smaller than that obtained by Ireland (1998). This
result may be interpreted in two ways:
(i) There is a common trend in inﬂation and unemployment due to nu.I nt h i s
case, βu = 1/(αλ(1 + αω)) and its small value is due to a high value of
λ,the central bank’s inﬂation aversion. 14 In this case, λ is constant across
regimes.
(ii) Inﬂation is stationary and the stochastic trend in unemployment is due to
something other than nu,e.g. zt, κ,or ns. It is possible that changes in
regime are due to changes in λ.15
Wefavor the second explanation,and the restof this section will presentresults that support
this idea.
In Table 4 we present speciﬁcation tests and some system properties for 3 MS–VAR mod-
els. System 1 is deﬁned from (8) with yt = (πt − .039ut,∆ut) and k = 2,System 2 uses
yt = (πt,∆ut),i.e. assumes that inﬂation is stationary,whereas System 3 is given by (5)
with k = 3. In terms of the equation-by-equation tests in Panel A16 the three MS–VAR sys-
tems behave satisfactorily. The system tests give a similar picture thus suggesting that an
MS–VAR model with 2 states and a low lag order is consistent with the data.
In Panel C we report some system properties of the three MS–VAR models. Systems 1 and
2 generally display the same behavior,suggesting that conditional on a unit root inﬂation
is stationary,whereas System 3 diﬀers primarily in terms of its high maximum eigenvalue
(e1 close to unity). Comparing these system properties to those of the linear VAR models
(see Panel C in Table 2) we ﬁnd that the information criteria are smaller for the MS–VAR
models. This is often due to higher log-likelihood values as well as a lower dimension of
the parameter vector. Given the better performance of the speciﬁcation tests,these results
support the view that for the U. S. data an MS–VAR model with 2-states and a low lag order
is to be preferred over a single regime model with a higher lag order.
3.3. Regime Properties of Inﬂation and Unemployment in the U. S.
In this section we will ﬁrst consider the robustness of the estimated regimes over small
changes in the preselected parameters. Second,the estimated ﬁrst and second moments
14 In principle,it may also be due to high values of α and/or ω,but this seems less likely.
15 Ireland (1998) reports that inﬂation is indeed a borderline case and may very well be stationary. His
theoretical model does not,however,allow for the possibility of diﬀerent stochastic trends in inﬂation and
unemployment. The reason is that the sources behind the trend in unemployment are not modeled.
16 See Hamilton (1996) for details on the setup of the three hypotheses for the F-versions of the conditional
scores test due to Newey (1985),Tauchen (1985),and White (1987).
–10–conditional on the regime are presented,and,ﬁnally,we compare these to the eﬀects of
small changes in the parameters of the economic model.
The estimated smooth probabilities,i.e. Pr [st = 1|xT,x T−1,...x 1; ˆ θ],are displayed for 4
models in Figure 4. In Graph I the model is given by (5) with 3 lags and zero restrictions
on the 3rd lag for the parameters on unemployment; Graph II gives the estimated state 1
probabilities for a 2 lag version of (5) with zero restrictions on the 2nd lag of unemployment;
Graph III contains the estimates for a 2 lag model of the type in equation (8) with inﬂation
stationary while unemployment has a unit root (i.e. this model is the same as the model in
Graph I but with a unit root restriction); and ﬁnally Graph IV presents the estimates for a
2 lag version of (8) with inﬂation and unemployment cointegrating with the coeﬃcient on
unemployment equal to 1.84 (the Johansen ML estimate from the VAR(12) model).
The four models give very similar estimates. The major diﬀerence is the period between
late 1975 and the end of 1979. Here the model estimates in Graphs I and III suggest that
the regime process remains in Regime 1,whereas the estimates in Graphs II and IV prefer
Regime 2. From a statistical point of view,the models that yield the plots in Graphs I
and III are to be preferred.17 Comparing these estimates to the case when βu = .039 (the
grid estimate),we ﬁnd that the smooth probabilities are virtually the same as those for the
βu = 0 case. The maximum posterior estimates of the regime process are taken from the
βu = 0 model,and these regime estimates are displayed in Figure 1,where the shaded areas
represent Regime 2.18
In Table 5 we present the estimated unconditional (Panel A) and conditional (Panel B)
moments of yt systems under the grid estimate of βu and under the assumption that in-
ﬂation is stationary while unemployment has a unit root. The conditional moments refer
to conditioning on the current state only,e.g. the conditional mean is E[yt|st]; analytical
formulas and the estimation of such moments is examined by Warne (1999b). From Panel B
it can be seen that inﬂation (or the cointegrating relationship) tends to be higher on aver-
age in Regime 1 and also more volatile than during Regime 2. Similarly,unemployment is
typically rising in Regime 1 and falling during Regime 2.19 Hence,Regime 1 (Regime 2) can
be characterized as a high (low) inﬂation,rising (falling) unemployment regime with large
(small) variances.
The eﬀects on the ﬁrst and second moments of inﬂation and unemployment from chang-
ing the theoretical parameters in the model in Section 2.1 were presented in Table 1. Since
17 There are signs of model misspeciﬁcation for the 2 lag model of xt,while the model with βu = 0h a sa
much higher log-likelihood value than the model with βu = 1.84.
18 The maximum posterior estimate for st is deﬁned by
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,t = p + 1,...,T.
19 The standard errors are computed using the delta method with numerical partial derivatives.
–11–we have modeled the U. S. unemployment series as nonstationary (while unemployment
growth is taken as stationary),the theoretical model needs to be respeciﬁed to account for
such nonstationarity. In the Appendix we present two plausible hypotheses. First,there is
a (common) stochastic trend in the wage setters’ and central bank’s employment targets.
Second,there is a stochastic trend in technology. In the latter case,inﬂation is always sta-
tionary,while the former case implies that inﬂation is stationary when n∗
t −nu
t is stationary.
In Table 6 we give the eﬀects on the mean and the variance of inﬂation and unemployment
growth from changes in the wage elasticity of labor supply (ω) and the central bank’s weight
on inﬂation (λ). The theoretical predictions from changes in these parameters are quite
similar under both types of nonstationarity (cf. Panels A and B in Table 6). In particular,if
the central bank’s weight on inﬂation (λ) is higher in Regime 2 than in Regime 1,shifting
from Regime 1 to Regime 2 results in a lower mean and variance of inﬂation as we have
found for the U. S. data. According to both theoretical models,average unemployment
growth will,however,not be aﬀected. Since the mean rate of change in Regime 1 is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,it still seems quite likely that it is diﬀerences in λ that
separate the two regimes. Speciﬁcally,an increase in λ may raise or lower the variance of
unemployment growth depending on how large λ is in relation to ω and α (capital’s share of
value added). The properties of the MS–VAR model are thus consistent with the prediction
of the theoretical model if λ is not too large. Hence,the theoretical model can explain the
empirical patterns in Table 5.
In Figure 5 we have plotted unemployment against monthly and yearly inﬂation,respec-
tively,for the 10 subsamples determined by the maximum posterior estimate of the regime
process. In most cases,the plots suggest a horizontal Phillips curve within a subsample
although there are some weak tendencies of a negative relation.
3.4. Conclusions about the U. S. Data
Our model of unemployment and inﬂation in the U. S. shares certain similarities with,but
is in important ways diﬀerent from,the model by e.g. Ireland (1998) and King and Watson
(1994). Ireland suggests that there is a stochastic trend in the natural level of unemployment
that,through monetary policy,is translated into a stochastic trend in inﬂation. U. S. inﬂation
rose (fell) before (after) 1980 because of the changes in the natural rate of unemployment,
but monetary policy has been stable over time. In contrast,our results suggest that the
stochastic trend in unemployment does not inﬂuence inﬂation,and that a short run relation
between unemployment and inﬂation has varied because of changes in monetary policy.
The period 1973–83 was a high inﬂation regime because the Fed put relatively more weight
on employment during this period. Analogously,1991–98 has been a low inﬂation regime
because the weight on employment has been relatively low.
–12–Our analysis does not suggest that negative supply shocks are unimportant for inﬂation.
But in the theoretical model we propose,and we believe also in reality,such shocks do
not aﬀect the average level of inﬂation. If there is strong persistence in inﬂation,single
negative supply shocks may of course have lasting eﬀects on inﬂation,but this only raises
the question why there is such persistence in inﬂation. Many theoretical models suggest
that inﬂation persistence will increase if the central bank’s objective function puts a larger
weight on employment stabilization (e.g.,Rogoﬀ,1985,Svensson,1999). This is also our
explanation of why inﬂation stays high for extended periods of time.20
Orphanides (1999) shows that the Fed overestimated the potential level of output during
the 1970’s. In the version of Rogoﬀ’s (1985) model that we use,this may be interpreted as
an increase in the central bank’s employment target n∗,and will indeed give rise to a larger
inﬂation bias whenever n∗ >n u (wage setters’ employment target). However,this should
aﬀect neither the variance of inﬂation nor the variance of unemployment,while empirically
we do ﬁnd that high inﬂation regimes are associated with more volatility. Such a relation is
easier to understand if we allow for changes in the central bank’s inﬂation aversion.
Ireland (1998) proposes that inﬂation and unemployment are both nonstationary (al-
though inﬂation is a borderline case) and cointegrated. King and Watson (1994) also suggest
that both series are nonstationary,but do not ﬁnd them to be cointegrated. They stress that
the links between inﬂation and unemployment are unstable over time,and indicate that
there are recurrent changes in regime. Conditional on the regimes,we ﬁnd that inﬂation
and unemployment may be cointegrated,but in that case the “long run Phillips curve” is
almost horizontal and we may as well treat inﬂation as stationary.
King and Watson emphasize that a distinguishing feature of the 1970–92 period is per-
sistence in the eﬀects of shocks. Our results are consistent with the view that this is mainly
due to the Fed’s weight on employment being relatively high during 1971–83.
20 Ireland notes that his (Barro–Gordon) model cannot explain the persistence in inﬂation.
–13–Appendix
We present a version of Rogoﬀ’s (1985) model. The presentation follows Rogoﬀ closely,and
where notation is obvious we leave out detailed explanations.
Production is determined by a Cobb–Douglas function
yt = ακ + (1 − α)nt + zt, (A.1)
where κ is the ﬁxed capital stock and technology, zt,follows the process
zt = ρzt−1 + εz,t, (A.2)
with εz,t being white noise with mean zero and variance σ2
z . Proﬁt maximization,taking pt
and wt as given,yields the labor demand function
nD
t = nd −
1
α




where nd = κ +ln(1−α)/α. The (notional) labor supply function is assumed to be given by
nS
t = ns + ω(wt − pt). (A.4)
However,the wage is set at w
f
t in period t − 1,and labor is supplied inﬁnitely elastically at
that wage in period t. Hence,employment in period t is given by









The wage is set in order to minimize Et−1(nt − nu
t−1)
2,where nu
t−1 is the wage setters’
employment target in period t − 1 for period t. The nominal wage for period t is therefore
w
f
t = Et−1pt + α(nd − nu
t−1) + ρzt−1. (A.6)
The central bank’s objective function is given by
Λt = (nt − n∗
t )
2 + λ(πt − π∗)
2, (A.7)
where n∗




















Rational expectations,(A.6) and (A.8) imply






–14–Using (A.6) and (A.9) in (A.8) and deﬁning πt = pt − pt−1 then yields


















Deﬁning unemployment as ut = nS
t − nt (noting that wt = w
f
t ) and using (A.6) we get
ut = ns − nu











Inserting (A.9) and (A.10) into (A.11) gives
ut = ns − nu





















while labor supply is
nS











t = n∗, nu
t = nu,and ρ = 0 yield the inﬂation and unemployment
relations in equations (2) and (3).
A Stochastic Trend in the Employment Targets
Suppose that the employment targets evolve according to the process
nu
t = nu
t−1 + εu,t, (A.15)
n∗
t = n∗ + γnu
t−1, (A.16)
where εu,t is white noise with mean zero and variance σ2
u. In addition,suppose that ρ = 0.
From (A.10) we ﬁnd that











while (A.12) provides us with





Hence,unemployment is nonstationary and driven by the stochastic trend in wage setters’





We thus ﬁnd that inﬂation is stationary if (and only if) γ = 1. Moreover,the sign of the
slope of the long run Phillips curve depends entirely on how big γ is.
–15–Moreover,if we deﬁne a short run Phillips curve according to
ut = un
t + φ(πt − Et−1πt), (A.17)
with the natural rate of unemployment being given by
un
t ≡ ns + ωαnd − (1 + αω)nu
t−1
then the slope of the short run Phillips curve is given by φ = αλ − ω. The model thus
exhibits a negatively sloped curve if λ<ω / α .
A Stochastic Trend in Technology
Suppose instead that nu
t = nu, n∗
t = n∗,while ρ = 1. From (A.10) we now have that










while (A.12) gives us




Inﬂation is thus stationary,while unemployment is nonstationary and driven by the sto-
chastic trend in technology. Accordingly, βu = 0.
In this case,there are two ways we can deﬁne the natural rate of unemployment for (A.17).
With
un
t ≡ ns − nu + (nd − nu) + ωzt−1,
we ﬁnd that φ = αλ − ω.I fi n s t e a dw el e t
un
t ≡ ns − nu + (nd − nu) + ωzt,
then φ = αλ(1 + αω). Hence,the latter deﬁnition leads to a positively sloped short run
Phillips curve,while the former deﬁnition is consistent with both a negative and a positive
slope parameter.
–16–Table 1: Eﬀects on the mean and the variance of inﬂation and unemployment from changes
in the theoretical parameters.
Inﬂation Unemployment
Parameter Interpretation Mean Variance Mean Variance
π∗ inﬂation target +000
n∗ central bank’s +000
employment target
nu wage setters’ − 0 − 0
employment target
λ central bank’s −−0?
weight on
inﬂation
α capital’s share −− ??
of value added
ns labor supply 00+0
κ capital stock 00+0
ω wage elasticity 00??
of labor supply
σ2
z variance of 0+0+
supply shock
Notes: If nd is greater (less) than nu,then the mean of unemployment is in-
creasing (decreasing) in ω (cf. equation (3)). Similarly,the mean of unemploy-
ment is increasing (decreasing) in α if nd +1/(1 −α) is greater (less) than nu.










This variance is increasing (decreasing) in ω if λ is less (greater) than ω/α;i t




and decreasing in α if λ<ω / α
or λ>2(ω/α)+1/α2; and it is increasing (decreasing) in λ if λ is greater (less)
than ω/α.
–17–Table 2: Cointegration analysis for bivariate VAR(k) models of inﬂation and unemployment
for the U. S.,1959:1–1998:12
(A) Cointegration Tests
# lags # Unit Roots Eigenvalue LRtr p-value
6 2 .0493 28.71 .00
1 .0099 4.72 .32
8 2 .0409 25.63 .01
1 .0125 5.92 .20
10 2 .0572 32.34 .00
1 .0099 4.67 .32
12 2 .0575 30.96 .00
1 .0069 3.24 .54
(B) Testing for Stationarity
ut πt
#l a g s LR p-value LR p-value
6 15.04 .00 6.48 .01
8 8.56 .00 7.35 .01
10 13.22 .00 14.07 .00
12 15.24 .00 14.99 .00
(C) Estimates of πt − βuut
#l a g s βu lnL AIC BIC LIL
6 1.22 −943.58 4.10 4.74 4.20
8 1.71 −924.50 4.07 4.88 4.20
10 1.91 −907.34 4.05 5.05 4.21
12 1.84 −889.93 4.03 5.20 4.21
–18–Table 3: Testing for serial correlation and ARCH for the U. S. in a linear VAR(k)m o d e l ,
1959:1–1998:12
(A) Serial Correlation Tests
# lags # Unit Roots Ljung-Box Test p-value LM Test p-value
60 527.32 .01 18.81 .00
1 526.18 .01 18.60 .00
80 481.44 .08 19.48 .00
1 482.53 .09 18.75 .00
10 0 485.36 .03 20.84 .00
1 486.99 .03 20.09 .00
12 0 460.10 .09 12.02 .02
1 459.91 .10 11.72 .02
Notes: The Ljung-Box test concerns the ﬁrst 118 autocorrelations,while the LM statis-
tic concerns serial correlation at the 12th lag for the residuals.
(B) Testing for ARCH
ut–equation πt–equation
# lags # Unit Roots ARCH(k) p-value ARCH(k) p-value
6020.49 .00 44.35 .00
1 20.62 .00 42.51 .00
8016.48 .04 33.47 .00
1 16.30 .04 32.64 .00
10 0 22.04 .01 26.43 .00
1 21.06 .02 26.09 .00
12 0 17.82 .12 25.32 .01
1 18.60 .10 25.48 .01
–19–Table 4: Speciﬁcation based on conditional scores in 2-state MS–VAR(k)s y s t e m sf o rt h e
U. S.,1959:1–1998:12
(A) Equation-by-equation Tests
System 1 System 2 System 3
(k = 2) (k = 2) (k = 3)
Hypothesis πt − .039ut ∆ut πt ∆ut πt ut
Autocorrelation .74 .61 .78 .62 .71 1.39
p-value .56 .65 .54 .65 .59 .24
ARCH .80 1.22 .84 1.12 1.34 .46
p-value .53 .34 .50 .35 .25 .76
Markov .25 .38 .26 .37 .27 1.78
p-value .91 .82 .91 .83 .89 .13
(B) System Tests
System 1 System 2 System 3
Hypothesis (βu = 0.039) (βu = 0) (πt,u t)
Autocorrelation .63 .64 .92
p-value .86 .86 .55
ARCH .96 .95 .79
p-value .54 .56 .81
Markov .30 .31 1.35
p-value .94 .93 .23
(C) System Properties
System 1 System 2 System 3
(βu = 0.039) (βu = 0) (πt,u t)
lnL(ˆ θ) −922.63 −922.65 −910.01
AIC 3.98 3.98 3.97
BIC 4.58 4.58 4.66
LIL 4.07 4.07 4.08
e1 .65 .65 .96
ˆ π1 .42 .42 .45
ˆ σπ1 .15 .15 .16
–20–Table 5: Estimated unconditional and conditional means and covariances for inﬂation and
unemployment in the U. S.,1959:1–1998:12
(A) Unconditional Moments
System Variable Mean Variance Covariance
πt − .039ut 3.85 12.38
1 (.60)( 3.44) .06
∆ut −.01 .04 (.06)
(.02)( . 01)
πt 4.09 12.39
2 (.60)( 3.44) .06




πt − .039ut 5.31 20.74
1 (1.01)( 4.48) .05
∆ut .02 .06 (.13)
(.08)( . 01)
πt 5.58 20.65
2 (1.01)( 4.47) .05
∆ut .02 .06 (.13)
(.03)( . 01)
Regime 2
πt − .039ut 2.80 3.72
1 (.20)( . 43) .00
∆ut −.03 .02 (.02)
(.01)( . 00)
πt 3.02 3.73
2 (.20)( . 43) .00
∆ut −.03 .02 (.02)
(.01)( . 00)
–21–Table 6: Eﬀects on the mean and the variance of inﬂation and unemployment growth from
changes in ω and λ.
(A) Stochastic Trend in Employment Targets


















































(B) Stochastic Trend in Technology




















































Notes: Panel A is based on the assumptions in equations (A.15) and (A.16) with γ = 1a n d ,
for simplicity, ρ = 0. The former implies that βu = 0 so that inﬂation is stationary. Now,
















The partial derivatives in Panel B are derived under the assumptions n
u
t = nu, n∗
t = n∗,while
ρ = 1. Here, βu = 0w i t h
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–24–Figure 3: The scaled log-likelihood function (solid line) and the estimated maximum eigen-
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Figure 4: Estimated smooth probabilities for 2–state MS–VAR(k) model for the U. S.,1959:1–
1998:12




































































(I) xt with k = 3 (II) xt with k = 2
(III) yt with βu = 0, k = 2( I V ) yt with βu = 1.84, k = 2
–25–Figure 5: Unemployment and monthly/yearly inﬂation in the U. S. for the estimated Regime 1 and Regime 2 periods.
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